Michael Eriksson
A Swede in Germany
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The ignorance presumption

Introduction and remarks

A problem with some (especially, Leftist) groups is the presumption that those outside the group, in general, or members of opposing groups, in particular, would be ignorant—often ridiculously so. This can take many shapes, including that those with a fancy degree would necessarily be better informed on random issues than those without one, in which case the assumption might be a blanket one, or that those who disagree give proof of being ignorant simply through disagreeing, which is much more case dependent (and where the groups might, at extremes, be defined by opinions). Below, I will look at some special cases of particular naivety and the problems that can result.

While the focus is on directly or indirectly political questions, and while my motivation is to address problems in the political area, the general issue is not limited to politics.

I use “he” pronouns more-or-less consistently throughout the text. Nevertheless, in my experiences until now, women might be more common than men among the “perpetrators” (overwhelmingly so within Feminism), with the reverse applying to the “victims”.

I use terms like “ignorant” to imply “ignorant with regard to some specific issue/problem/field/whatnot”. The matter of more general ignorance is off topic. Certainly, someone entirely ignorant of X might be a genuine expert on Y, and vice versa.


Side-note:

As some of these issues can go hand in hand with having a “fancy degree”, and as some of the readers might be among those who are simultaneously intellectual snobs and Leftists:

  1. I see nothing wrong in having a fancy degree. The problem is when someone jumps to conclusions based on that degree. There are utter morons with fancy degrees and highly intelligent, educated, capable, successful, whatnot, persons without them.

  2. Education matters more than degrees and formal studies are not necessarily the best way to get it. (And the ability to actually think matters more than mere education.)

  3. I have two master’s degrees, myself, which is well ahead of most of the potentially disagreeing simultaneous intellectual snobs and Leftists. (And my “intellectual merits”, were this a pissing contest, will usually trump theirs by a distance in other regards too.)


Main discussion

When I was a young child and felt mistreated, I complained that the adult counterpart had forgotten what it was like to be a child and promised that “when I am an adult, I will remember what it is like to be a child”.

Now, as an adult, contrary to my promise, I have forgotten much. However, I also still remember much and there is another difference of note—I have learnt what it is like to be an adult. Chances are that it was much the same with many of the “offending” adults of the past, that they did remember much of the child’s life, way of thinking, priorities, etc., while I, as the child, had no true comprehension of the adult’s life, having never been an adult. (The more so, as e.g. my parents were much younger at the time than I am today, and correspondingly closer to their childhoods.)

Here, we had an assumption made by young me that “because you, the adult, disagree with me, you are ignorant [of what it is like to be a child]”—and this even when it must be assumed that the adult had gone through a childhood, had made at least somewhat similar experiences to my own, including sometimes feeling unfairly treated, etc.

In a young child, this type of meta-ignorance (for want of a better term) is easy to understand, but, sadly, the same type of meta-ignorance is often present in adults—and even in the face of similarly strong contraindications.


Side-note:

But note that meta-ignorance does not arise merely from thinking someone else ignorant—it arises from thinking him ignorant in a manner that stems from own ignorance, and, especially, when the believed-to-be-ignorant actually has the greater knowledge/understanding/insight/whatnot in the matter at hand. (Cf. below examples.) On the contrary, in a wide set of ranges, the ignorant-seeming actually is ignorant, while the problem discussed here often arises because some set of viewpoints, (pseudo-)arguments, whatnot, have so wide a spread that an assumption of ignorance of them is unreasonable.


Consider (Gender-)Feminism: I grew up in Sweden, a society filled with Feminist ideas and propaganda, including constant allegations about glass ceilings and anti-woman discrimination, the need for pro-woman quotas, men mistreating women, how everything was so much harder for women, etc. and ad nauseam. Schools were dominated by female teachers and, significant portions of my childhood were spent in a household with no other males—my one sibling was a sister, my mother and father were divorced, and, after the very premature death of my maternal grandfather, the by far most important contact that we had was yet another woman, my maternal grandmother.

Similar remarks, family situation aside, apply to almost all Swedish men of my and younger generations.

Nevertheless, in debates with Feminists, there is almost invariably a Feminist attitude that “you are ignorant; I am enlightened; and if you just listen to my wisdom, you can learn something”—combined with talking points so elementary that they are virtually impossible for an adult to have missed. Effectively, the supposition must be that the counterpart has skipped school, avoided the papers and newscasts, whatnot, for years or decades (depending on his age).

In reality, it is the other way around: those who disagree with Feminists have had all the usual indoctrination, but have, over time, taken on more adult viewpoints, they have developed and used their skills to think critically, they have encountered and thought about other viewpoints than the Feminist orthodoxy, they have made experiences in life that are incompatible with Feminist claims, they have read statistics that prove various Feminist claims faulty, etc. It is, in fact, the Feminist who speaks from a position of ignorance (and meta-ignorance). (Generally, Feminism profits from one of the most successful propaganda machines in history, while having little to offer in terms of factual arguments. Cf. any number of older texts.)

A key point is this: What is more likely when two parties disagree, that the one party has not been exposed to even the most basic claims that have been propagated endlessly in public debate, in school, in the news, etc.—or that the other has failed to move on and learn something beyond these most basic claims? Indeed, even should the former actually be wrong, it is unlikely to be for so trivial reasons that repeating such basic claims will have any convincing value, as the error is likely to be far more subtle.


Side-note:

What goes on beyond these most basic points is, strictly speaking, off topic; however, pseudo-scientific fields like gender studies really have very little to add beyond these—just like a homeopathic researcher cannot lend more strength to the homeopathic ideas than can a random layman-believer in homeopathy. He might have a deeper understanding than the layman-believer, and more knowledge/statistics/whatnot available to him, but nothing can change the simple fact that homeopathy does not pan out. It is the same with both gender studies and Feminism—their main ideas do not pan out when the facts are on the table and critically investigated, and all they can do is to try to explain away why reality does not conform to their claims. (With the reservation that (a) at least gender studies could, in some other incarnation, turn into something more useful, (b) I refer to gender studies as a theoretical foundation for Feminism, while other aspects of gender studies could already have a legitimate existence and legitimate practices. Such legitimacy is likely to be rare, however, because there is an expectation that results support or, at a minimum, do not contradict a certain worldview.)



Side-note:

One reason why the former could still be wrong, even if less ignorant than the latter, is that a “boy who cried wolf” effect leads to skepticism towards even correct claims. For instance, in some areas (notably, the environment and COVID) the proponents of some viewpoint make too far-going claims, are caught with their pants down, refuse to admit that they have, at best, exaggerated (at worst, lied themselves blue), and are then disbelieved even when they make other claims, regardless of whether these claims are correct. We might, e.g., have a scenario where:

  1. A true expert claims that “if we do X, then Y might happen, but so very rarely that it is worth the risk”.

  2. Some dummy in the same camp as the true expert takes over and distorts the message to “if we do X, Y will never, ever happen, so we should do X”.

    (Often, I suspect, in a deliberate, grossly unethical, and intellectually dishonest attempt at being more convincing and preventing others from reaching the “wrong” conclusion, i.e. that we should not do X. However, it might also often go back to sheer incompetence.)

  3. Some non-dummy, non-expert notices that when X was done, sometimes Y did happen. He confronts the dummy with this fact.

  4. The dummy insists that Y never, ever happens and that any contrary claim is “fake news”.

  5. The non-dummy, non-expert (likely correctly) assumes that the dummy cannot be trusted on any point, and might, incorrectly, assume that everything that the dummy says is wrong. (The last being a misstep. However, especially with repeat offenders, I would see a policy of “I believe nothing that you claim until you deliver actual proof” as justified. Note that there is a great difference between “I am skeptical” and “you are wrong”.)

    With repeated poor experiences, e.g. with several different dummies, he might even assume that what the true expert says cannot be trusted. (Which is unfortunate, but highly understandable and something for which the dummies are too blame.)


The situation is similar in a number of fields, even if the level reached by Feminism-in-Sweden has usually only been reached much later in other fields and countries. (And that some specific cases are so recent innovations, or only so recently escaped from the pits of the most extremist Leftist academia, that they have not had time to build the same level of pervasiveness, often have even failed to, yet, reach the level of Leftist orthodoxy. Consider the anti-“Whiteness” hysteria of recent years.)

To take another specific example: What are the chances that someone with even just a high-school education would not be aware of Chernobyl and Fukushima and that too much radioactivity can cause health problems (cancer, in particular). That someone even slightly beyond that would be unaware of problems like how to handle and/or store radioactive waste and how some types of reactors can create material for nuclear weapons? (Indeed, even those with just a high-school education really should have an awareness of the latter issues, but I make allowances for poor memories and a lack of interest among many who did not proceed past high school. They were certainly mentioned repeatedly during my own school years. Note that I speak only of awareness, not of any deeper knowledge.)

In a next step, take someone in favor of nuclear power (I certainly am): What are the chances that he is completely ignorant of the above? What are the chances that he knows something that the “anti” crowd does not know? On the outside, without further knowledge, what are the chances that he might simply have a different set of priorities held even in the knowledge of Chernobyl (etc.)?

Nevertheless, “antis” rarely move beyond cheap talking points and the apparent belief that the “pro” camp is, exactly, filled with the completely ignorant, who, for some reason, refuse to acknowledge that nuclear power must be exterminated—or else!

In reality, unsurprisingly, most of the “anti” camp is grossly ignorant and does not understand such basic (but hardly ever mentioned in school, newspapers, and similar) points as how flawed and outdated the Chernobyl plant was (already almost forty years ago) and how much still had to go wrong at the same time; how much better security is in a modern design; how much more damage fossil fuels do, year in and year out, than nuclear power over its entire existence; how better solutions for waste handling are in development and/or how newer designs yield less dangerous waste to begin with; etc.


Side-note:

At an extreme, I have repeatedly seen absurd claims that a severe nuclear accident would cause an atomic explosion equivalent to setting off a multi-megaton nuclear bomb. (This is complete nonsense.) If the claim is made in good faith, it demonstrates the ignorance of the “antis” and how prone to believe panic-mongering they are; if it is a deliberate propaganda lie, it shows the depths of their dishonesty.

An interesting development over the last few years (year of writing: 2024) is that nuclear power is increasingly seen as legitimate even among environmentalists and the like—but not because they have gained a better understanding of the matter. Instead, global warming is seen as so great a threat that it trumps even the fear of nuclear power.


To conclude with an example of a somewhat different (and somewhat more understandable character), the COVID-countermeasure era contained a great many controversies, especially around things that could not, at the time, truly be known.


Side-note:

There are at least two differences to the prior examples, namely that the “orthodoxy” was not Left-dominated in the manner of some other issues and that they were often right. Nevertheless, it is my subjective impression that the “heretics” were right more often than wrong even on those issues that were up in the air in the early phases (as opposed to the issues where both sides agreed). Moreover, there were a number of issues where the orthodox sat on weak cards to begin with (and almost always lost) and where they continued to push an issue long after being disproved. Due to the mixture of uncertainties, changing takes, and the heterogeneity of opinions in both groups, it can be hard to say where a particular example belongs, but consider the issue of risk groups. An early and typical orthodox position, and one kept long after proof to the contrary existed, was that the idea of risk groups was not important, and that COVID would strike somewhat indiscriminately; the typical skeptic position, from day one, was that risk groups mattered and that efforts should be/should have been focused on the risk groups. History proved the skeptics right.

For the sake of precision: I use skeptic as a convenience term that seems more apposite and less clumsy than e.g. “non-orthodox”. The skepticism should be seen as directed against the orthodoxy, its message and methods, whatnot. No implication of skepticism about e.g. the existence of COVID is made (such skepticism was present in a small fringe group, blown-up in scope by some orthodox propagandists in the hope of discrediting larger groups of skeptics-in-my-sense).


On the one hand, skeptics were usually derided as ignorant of even the basics. (Unless, off topic, as deliberately providing disinformation, spreading false conspiracy theories for nefarious purposes, or similar.) Somehow they had missed what TV channels, newspapers, and whatnots loudly trumpeted into the world, and, somehow, basic instruction by one of the enlightened would remedy this—listen to the wisdom and come into the fold. In Germany, at least, we even had grocery stores putting up signs with COVID-orthodoxy and I was actually molested with COVID-orthodoxy after logging in to my online banking.

At worst, we had low-level grunts who presumed to “explain” matters to the public that they, themselves, did not truly understand, including to those who, regardless of whether orthodox or skeptic, had far better brains and far more education, were far more knowledgable, etc.

On the other, there were actually investigations made into “who knew what”, which showed that the average skeptic was more knowledgable on relevant matters than the average believer. Again, we have the same phenomenon: The typical skeptic does not disagree because he has missed what everyone else knows, he does so because he has spent more time reading, thinking, searching, whatnot. The typical orthodox knows the propaganda, but his scope of knowledge ends with the propaganda. (The orthodox might also have swallowed the propaganda without critical thought, or otherwise been “intellectually lazy” disproportionately often.)


Side-note:

I am tempted to mention issues like orthodox nobodies criticizing skeptic physicians and others with a relevant nominal expertise. This was arguably a problem, and, in as far as the physicians were supposed ignorant of the known-to-everyone basics of COVID, an example of the problem under discussion. However, care must be taken not to fall into the “argument by authority” and “has degree; ergo, is expert” traps. I have certainly encountered physicians who were less-than-stellar, including believers in homeopathic quackery. Sadly, it is possible to have a medical degree while being ignorant and/or stupid, and I would over-stretch my point if I denied the possibility that a physician is ignorant and/or stupid. I would, however, expect the average physician to be more knowledgeable and smarter than e.g. the average construction worker.

It must, however, be noted that a physician who believes in homeopathic quackery is typically not ignorant of the very basics of what homeopathy critics say on the topic. He is aware but also draws on e.g. pro-homeopathy courses and strong propaganda from various businesses that earn money from homeopathic “medicines”. This is a different type of ignorance from what sometimes seemed to be assumed about (COVID) skeptics, even when physicians. (Also note an older text on homeopath physicians and German homeopath-turned-critic Natalie Grams.)

In a bigger picture than the narrow current topic, we should measure the strength of someone’s opinion by the strength of his arguments—not of his formal qualifications.


Excursion on disagreement vs. ignorance

As can be seen from some of the above (and as discussed in some earlier texts; TODO import from Wordpress and link), it is important to understand why the other party disagrees.

Above, the offending groups are correct in that the disagreement stems from the ignorance of one of two parties to a conflict and just happen to have a faulty perception of which party is the ignorant one. However, the more general issue includes many other cases, e.g. when two parties disagree because of different priorities or because they follow different scientific theories (in cases where it has not yet been established which theory is the correct one).

Therefore, there is an enormous difference between seeing someone as ignorant just because of disagreement, which is the main issue here, and seeing someone as ignorant because of disagreement that has a poor reason.

Generally, opinions and their holders can be roughly grouped along two dimensions, based on being right or wrong and on having an opinion for a good or a poor reason. Someone who has the right opinion for a poor reason is often less worthwhile than someone who has the wrong opinion for a good reason. One of the core problems with the Left is that the combination of wrong opinion and poor reason is so horrifyingly common.

Excursion on boxing, backseat drivers, and politicians

An interesting juxtaposition is some opinions on boxing and my own opinions of politicians:


Side-note:

A similar idea to the boxing discussion below is present in “armchair quarterback”, and this might have been a better entry point for a U.S. audience. My exposure to gridiron football, however, has been far more superficial, and I would lack practical examples. To boot, there is no guarantee that this term or similar examples would work well outside the U.S.


Boxing forums are full of “backseat drivers”, some very well informed and intelligent, most less so. A particularly common family of complaints (during the times when I have taken an interest) is that too few boxers would be willing to “in-fight”, “go to the body”, “bob and weave”, and similar. It seems that everyone on the forums know that these are important aspects of boxing, that modern boxers do it too little, and that modern trainers show an incomprehensible lack of understanding.

Now, I do not rule out that some or many boxers and/or boxing trainers under-emphasize these aspects, but sometimes the criticism goes to an idiotic level, beginning with the ideas that the “proof of the pudding is in the eating” and that “if it works, don’t fix it”—if someone keeps winning, he must be doing something right and fiddling too much might do more harm than good.

This, in particular, when the boxer at hand is taller than his opponents, as with Wladimir Klitschko in most of his fights. (He was the leading heavy-weight during these times and an unusually common victim of such criticism.)

He has been characterized as someone who perfected the art of using his superior size to beat smaller opponents, and was, in terms of boxing style, an “outside boxer” and a “boxer-puncher”. What he did worked exceptionally well, and he has one of the most impressive heavyweight records in history. It is true that he proved insufficient against Tyson Fury, one of the very few opponents to be even taller, and that a better ability or willingness to e.g. “go to the body” would have helped him there, but this was just one of more than sixty fights—of which he won almost all, and often with ease. (To boot, his main problem in that fight was a failure to actually fight, and “going on the offense” would have been a prerequisite for “go to the body” to even matter. To boot, he was well past his prime at the time.)

That the taller guy (and/or the guy with the longer reach) prefers to be an out-fighter is natural—he can hit his opponent in the head at a range where his opponent cannot return the favor, and it is in the interest of his opponent to close the distance, while he should strive to keep the distance. Going to the body is all good and well, but doing so moves a boxers hands from their natural guard positions and opens lines for the opponent to go for the head—and the more so for a taller boxer, who might have to drop down a bit to effectively attack the body. Bobbing and weaving? Well, that is much easier for the shorter guy—and mainly serves a purpose of getting past the opponent’s fists to start an in-fight, which, again, the taller guy should not want to do in the first place.

Someone like Wladimir Klitschko had as little to gain by following this type of forum advice as Frazier in following the (hypothetical) advice to use his jab and reach to outbox Ali from the distance.


Side-note:

There is also some potential for historical changes, that what was true at one time is not necessarily true at another. It might, e.g., be that “going to the body” was more beneficial in the old 15-round era than in the current 12-round era, because (in my understanding) the effect of hits to the body builds up gradually and, from the point of view of the aggressor, is an investment in the future, something that might prove valuable in a few rounds’ time. (KOs from body punches do happen, but they are much rarer than those from head punches.)

From another point of view, it might be that blows to the head are easier for the judges to notice than blows to the body, which could make the former a better choice for winning on the score cards, even should they have been a worse choice for winning by KO or for winning a street fight.

(Other factors yet might apply.)


To turn to me and politicians, could not something similar be going on? Might I be a metaphorical forum participant calling for Joe Biden to go for the body when he is well advised to head hunt in the style of Klitschko? The questions are warranted, but I have good reason to believe that the answer is “no”, beginning with the fact that I actually ask myself such questions on a regular basis.


Side-note:

Generally, I strongly recommend turning around various questions (insights, observations, whatnot) usually applied to others, to see whether they might not apply in the other direction too. (Looking at myself: sometimes they do, and I can take corresponding corrective action; sometimes they do not.)

However, I do not deny that I sometimes speak in a more generalizing manner about others (politicians and Leftists, especially; Leftist politicians doubly so) than is always warranted, be it out of irritation or a wish to keep a text simpler than it otherwise might threaten to be.


Looking more in detail, I have spent a great amount of time on topics like history and economics, with a great focus on actual understanding, more so than most politicians can realistically claim, I have strong arguments for my positions and similar positions are held by experts, I have often been able to say that “X is a shitty idea, because Y will happen” and have later seen X implemented and Y actually happening, etc. When politicians stubbornly disagree, even in face of historical precedence, I am rightfully concerned. I also have enough insight into the world of politicians that I understand issues like vote fishing, political bargaining, and other factors that can lead to decisions that are objectively poor—even when the politician at hand actually knows better. (Which is not to say that I consider vote fishing and whatnot legitimate—just that I understand the effect on political decision making.) Likewise, I understand that much of disagreements are a matter of priorities, but when the priorities of the politicians are nefarious, short-sighted, or otherwise problematic, this does not make matters better. Etc. (To continue the boxing discussion: there is great room for decisions, up to and including throwing a fight, that might make sense from an “earn money” perspective, but are poor decisions from a boxing perspective, are unethical or illegal, or otherwise worthy of condemnation. Big-time politicians, at least, play with enormous stakes and with dire consequences for others when poor decisions are made, in a manner that makes poor decisions so much worse than in boxing, regardless of the reason for the decisions.)

Add to this that very many politicians actually are poorly qualified and intellectually unimpressive by objective standards (relative both me and the job at hand), good enough at manipulation to gain office, but not necessarily good at performing the duties of the office, and, to boot, spend more time on matters like gaining popularity than on their “continued education”. (While “continued education” has been at the core of my life since I left formal education behind.)


Side-note:

That the qualities beneficial for gaining an office, earning a promotion, whatnot, are often very different from those needed to do the job is a general problem, and one which also explains many problems in the business world.


The main point where I have a potential deficit in my understanding is something else: the question of what problems among politicians go back to incompetence and what to other factors, e.g. power hunger or an ideological conviction that forces a particular choice even when it is harmful.

A similar point is when a position arises from fairly basic (and potentially correct information) overridden by more advanced but (at least partially) incorrect information. (As opposed to a lack of even basic information. This case forms an interesting mirror image to some of the above, where incorrect basic information is overridden by more advanced correct information.) To judge such a matter about someone else can be very tricky when the basic information is not so very basic as in some of the above examples.


Side-note:

For instance, the talking points of Feminists are very pervasive in Sweden, reaching virtually everyone. To gain a non-trivial exposure to even (the popular with the Left) Keynesianism, let alone, say, (the unpopular with the Left) Austrian economics, active own measures are needed—and the more so if the exposure should result in actual understanding.

We can then, with a very high degree of probability, assume that a random guy off a Swedish street knows the Feminist talking points, but when it comes to basic economics, no such assumption can be made. Indeed, even with politicians, the chances need not be good.

Likewise, understanding the Feminist talking points does not require much in terms of brains, while understanding even “101 level” economics might be beyond some parts of the population.


Excursion on politicians as parents

I have long contemplated a text comparing politicians-relative-citizens with parents-relative-children. For want of time, and for the time being, I replace this text with a partial treatment of aspects relevant to parts of this page, notably in a partial continuation of the previous excursion:


Side-note:

I continue to use formulations focused on politicians. This in part for continuity with the above; in part, because other terms might be too specific or otherwise unsatisfactory (“law maker”, e.g., fails on the many who are not law makers, as with the POTUS; “elected official” is vague and cabinet members are usually appointed, not elected; etc.). That said, the terminology is suboptimal and much of the discussion, had it not been for continuity, might be better phrased in terms of whoever-is-in-power, the government, or similar. Likewise, many politicians do not hold any actual power for want of electoral success, and the word is contextually best read as restricted to those who do hold power and, especially, high-level power.


To make a direct comparison with my early situation relative adults is tricky, because my memories of specific incidents are too vague. However, looking at my then and other small children’s situation relative parents, unpopular parental decisions have different characteristics. Off the top of my head, and without any claim of completeness, the most significant types are:


Side-note:

An older discussion of categories of laws shows considerable overlap, but is, of course, written from a government–citizen perspective, while the below is written from a parent–child perspective.

Both in that text and below, it is notable how “good” categories/types are usually neglected and “bad” ones favored by the politicians.


  1. Decisions that are for the perceived good of the children, which might be a necessary evil in light of the difference in brain power, how shortsighted children tend to be, and similar.

    (Help with self-discipline, e.g. when to get out of bed, might be a special case or might warrant an item of its own. I treat it as a special case, for now, as a separate discussion would bring no obvious benefit.)

    A corresponding approach by the government relative adult citizens fails on the fact that the adults are adults and should have the right to run their own lives. Even, however, if we were allow the general idea, it must be limited to those who actually are sufficiently low on brain-power and whatnot that government control is beneficial. To apply it in a blanket manner over the entire population, including those who are smarter, more capable, better educated, whatnot than the politicians, is inexcusable.

    Nevertheless, this blanket application, and on far too many issues, is the standard procedure.

    As an aside: Even parents relative their children often get things wrong. The politicians relative adult citizens and, in particular, superior adult citizens are far more likely to do so.

  2. Decisions that are for the good of the parents, e.g. to send a child to bed earlier than warranted in order to have some child-free time in the evening.

    While understandable, to some degree, where parents are concerned, the same type of decision has no place whatever in politics. Nevertheless, such decisions abound, to allow politicians to force their own ideology onto others, to favor the pet groups of the politicians, to buy the votes needed for re-election, to gain rewards from lobbyists, etc.

  3. Decisions that reject unreasonable, unfair, or unhelpful requests from children. (That the adult do something for the child that the child could and should do, that the rights of another child be violated in favor of the requesting child, that the child be allowed to dodge responsibility and accountability, and similar.)

    Politicians should turn such requests down, too, with my full support. (And I do not make such request, so it would not alter my own position.) The problem is the opposite—that they, often, do not turn such requests down. The result is negative consequences for everyone else, including the Peters in “robbing Peter to pay Paul” scenarios.

  4. Decisions that enforce restrictions from other sources, e.g. a “Yes, you must go to school today!”.

    Usually such restrictions on parents come from politicians and equivalents forcing or “forcing” politicians in the same way as parents are very rare—and, usually and ultimately, come from the politicians themselves. (Restrictions that prevent politicians from interfering, e.g. through constitutionally protected rights, are of greater significance.)

    An example of such a forcing would be the implementation of a EU directive by individual member countries and politicians on the national level, after the directive was decided by politicians at the EU level—often according to the wishes of the politicians on the national level.


    Side-note:

    To boot, many parental scenarios, including forcing a child to go to school, can overlap with other types and/or pose problems with where to draw borders. For instance, a parent might have forced a child to school even absent a legal restriction, because it was perceived as in the child’s best interest (first type). For instance, it could be argued that the legal restriction causes a “type two” issue for the parent: If the situation is or would be recurring, even a school-skeptic parent might force the children to school for the specific purpose of avoiding legal consequences, like fines or, even, jail time. We might even have a “type two” without legal interference, e.g. because a child in school is a child not underfoot.


  5. Decisions that serve to ensure fair treatment of others, stable rules in interactions, and similar, e.g. to keep two siblings from destructive fighting or to stop a child from harassing other adults with undue noise.

    Here legitimate political equivalents are present and to be welcomed. However, as with many parents, here the politicians often fail to intervene properly, be it through a failure to make fair and sensible such laws or through a failure to impose them in a fair and sensible manner.

Parenthetically, I note two points that are more off topic here but of relevance to the planned other text:

Firstly: Minors automatically leave their parents sphere of control when they reach a certain age (often, 18). This age has tendentially been lowered over time (a historically common age was 21), and minors of sufficient own ability and/or of sufficiently problematic parents (in some jurisdictions) have the option to become emancipated before that age. The same does not apply to citizens relative the government, no matter how able or old the citizen, no matter how incompetent or abusive the government. On the contrary, government control has tendentially grown stronger over time, in a reversal of the parent–minor situation. Likewise, as the government is ultimately the arbiter, the worse the government, the more likely it is to extend and enforce its power over the citizens, with no possibility for a court to intervene with an emancipation. (I have some ideas about an emancipation-from-the-government scheme, which could, e.g., be used to allow someone to withdraw from otherwise mandatory insurance schemes and various “welfare” state nonsense, and, generally, reduce the destruction of civil rights that results from big governments and nanny governments. As this goes contrary to the citizen-hostile attitude of the typical government, the scheme is highly hypothetical, however.)

This is the more paradoxical as the life of a human, in its natural state and following its nature, could be viewed as an ever-increasing journey towards more self-determination, independence, responsibility, capability, whatnot, beginning with the first attempts of a toddler to grab and manipulate objects, to walk, and to talk, and stretching forward until old age imposes limits. What current society, with its nanny states, overlong school years, and over-protective parents, does is to halt this journey in its tracks, to delay or prevent human growth for a disturbingly large proportion of the people—and in a so uniform manner that little concern is given to individual differences, leaving the people as a lawn mowed and weeded to the pleasure of its owner instead of a flowering field of individual plants.

Secondly: Christianity is a religion based on the existence of an all-knowing and all-powerful entity (God), in which following the will of God is a paramount virtue. In Christianity, free (own, human) will and the right not to follow the will of God are still central points. Not doing so might end badly, just like not having health insurance in the secular world, but the choice is still up to the human, while health insurance is (often and increasingly) enforced by law—and even when it no longer truly serves as an insurance for the benefit of the insured but as, e.g., a means to redistribute money from the one group to the other, to the disadvantage of the insured. More generally, where Christianity and the all-knowing God grant free will, governments and incompetent politicians insist on obedience and enforce it with violence, should it be necessary, and often, even, remove the possibility for the citizen to take a stand and risk the violence, e.g. by withdrawing money straight from his bank account or by having an employer divert income tax before paying an employee his salary.

Excursion on pride among those with little knowledge

Looking back at some encounters, I suspect that there is a problem with actual ignorants taking pride in what little knowledge or pseudo-knowledge that they do have, e.g. in that an intellectual nobody goes through a political indoctrination course, feels that he knows something that most others do not, takes pride, and wishes to share his knowledge—even be the knowledge only half-understand by him, presented with extreme over-simplifications in the course, or actual disinformation. Ditto when an intellectual nobody reads a book for the first time in ten years.

This with the complication that the pride in the presumed knowledge (likely, in combination with his limited intellectual horizons) can reduce the risk that he questions that knowledge.

This, of course, is not limited to politics, but can include e.g. books on various occult/esoteric topics.


Side-note:

An interesting question is whether pride in something, more generally, could be an indication of lesser accomplishment rather than greater. This, especially, when the accumulated accomplishments are on the same level, as opposed to on a continually higher level. It might e.g. be that accomplishment at the same level grows stale and is taken for granted, while only accomplishment at a higher level (temporarily) triggers renewed pride. At the same time, gaining accomplishment at a lower level is easier than at a higher level, making that feeling of pride more likely. Moreover, someone of lesser accomplishment might be less likely to have an accurate estimate of his own level of accomplishment.